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As healthcare delivery options drastically expand and change, patients
and physicians continue to interact in unique ways. These interactions have
become more complex and unconventional, challenging courts to establish
whether a duty of care exists between the physician and patient in these new
situations. Courts that answer this duty question affirmatively do so either
by applying a more capacious understanding of the traditional physicianpatient relationship or by deeming foreseeability of harm and reliance
sufficient under certain circumstances, even in the absence of an actual
physician-patient relationship.
This Note investigates this unresolved duty question in two contexts:
curbside consultations—when a physician is informally consulted by a peer
physician to give advice on a case—and when on-call physicians make
healthcare decisions without directly contacting the patient. This Note
argues that in the context of curbside consultations, courts should find that
providing advice alone is insufficient to create a duty of care unless there is
an affirmative act associated with it. In the context of on-call physicians, a
physician’s on-call status alone should be insufficient to create a duty of care
unless there is a significant degree of affiliation between the on-call
physician and the patient’s case.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2014, Susan Warren arrived at a healthcare clinic complaining of
abdominal pain, a fever, and chills.1 Sherry Simon, a nurse practitioner,
promptly ordered a battery of tests, which demonstrated that Ms. Warren had
an unusually high level of white blood cells.2 Nurse Simon suspected that
Ms. Warren had an infection that required hospitalization and, therefore, she
began the process of admitting her to a local hospital.3 Per protocol, Nurse
Simon contacted the local hospital and spoke with an on-call hospitalist, Dr.
Richard Dinter, who determined—without personally examining Ms.
Warren—that she was just suffering from diabetes and did not need to be
admitted.4 Three days later, Ms. Warren died from sepsis caused by an
untreated staph infection.5
This case was not unusual.6 Today, patients receive healthcare in a myriad
of ways, such as through direct physician-patient interactions, telemedicine,
outpatient facilities, or as a result of consultations and referrals between
physicians.7 Situations like those just described present a unique question
that remains largely unanswered: When can a patient who did not directly
seek care from a physician in a traditional health care encounter bring a viable
claim against that physician? More specifically, do physicians owe a duty of
care to these nontraditional patients, entitling them to damages resulting from
negligence or medical malpractice claims?8
This question requires an investigation into the fundamentals of negligence
law. Historically, many courts would not have found Dr. Dinter liable for
Ms. Warren’s death due to the absence of a traditional physician-patient
relationship.9 However, courts today engage in a more nuanced analysis of
whether Dr. Dinter owes a duty of care to those such as Ms. Warren. They
ask not only whether a nontraditional physician-patient relationship existed10
but also whether, despite the absence of such a relationship, a duty of care
existed on the basis of an undertaking, the creation of risk, foreseeability, or
as matter of public policy.11
1. Warren v. Dinter, 926 N.W.2d 370, 372 (Minn. 2019).
2. Id. A high white blood cell count can indicate a multitude of physiological conditions,
including, but not limited to, the presence of an infection. High White Blood Cell Count, MAYO
CLINIC (Nov. 30, 2018), https://www.mayoclinic.org/symptoms/high-white-blood-cell-count/
basics/causes/sym-20050611 [https://perma.cc/4L26-SSRE].
3. Warren, 926 N.W.2d at 372.
4. Id. at 372–73.
5. Id. at 373.
6. See infra Part I.B.2.
7. See infra Part I.B.2.
8. See infra Part I.A.1. This Note refers to individuals bringing lawsuits based on care
received indirectly or through a nontraditional interaction as nontraditional patients.
9. See infra Part I.B.1. For a definition of a traditional physician-patient relationship,
see infra notes 45–47 and accompanying text.
10. See infra Part I.A.2.
11. See infra Part I.A.3.
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This Note will examine the divergent approaches courts use to analyze the
duty element in two scenarios in our modern health care system: when
physicians engage in curbside consultations and when on-call physicians
make decisions that affect patients they have never personally treated.12
During curbside consultations, a treating physician contacts another
physician informally to gain an opinion or recommendation on a patient’s
case.13 In such scenarios, however, it is unclear whether providing advice
can create a duty of care.14 Similarly, when a physician is on call, there are
certain expectations and obligations that follow.15 However, it is unclear if
and when they may owe a duty of care to patients when they are not
physically present, are unreachable, or are supervising other healthcare
professionals.16 These unique situations challenge traditional tort law and
have led to a nonuniform duty analysis among courts.17
This Note strives to clarify the doctrinal, practical, and policy decisions
courts make in determining whether a physician owes a duty of care to a
nontraditional patient. Based on the case law for curbside consultations and
on-call situations and the basic principles and policies of tort law, this Note
argues that courts should formulate a clear legal rule that balances the
expectations of physicians and the interests of patients.18 For curbside
consultations, courts should find a duty of care only if there is an affirmative
act associated with the provision of advice.19 In the context of on-call
physicians, a physician’s on-call status alone should be insufficient to create
a duty of care unless there is a significant degree of affiliation between the
on-call physician and the patient’s case.20 Thus, in either scenario,
foreseeability alone should not create a duty of care.
This Note is divided into three parts. Part I discusses the requirements,
qualifications, and exceptions to the duty element in medical malpractice and
negligence cases, along with current and historical approaches to these cases.
Part II establishes the conflict among courts on the issue of whether there is
a duty of care in the context of curbside consultations and on-call physicians.
Finally, Part III proposes the creation of a clear legal rule, whereby courts
look to either the presence of an affirmative act for a curbside consultation
case or the degree of affiliation for a case involving an on-call physician. If
these factors are not present, courts should not find a duty of care.

12. See infra Part II.
13. Curbside Consultations, PSYCHIATRY(EDGMONT), May 2010, at 51, 51 (stating that
physicians generally view curbside consultations as low-risk and distinctly different from
ordinary physician-patient interactions).
14. See infra Part II.A.
15. See infra Part II.B.
16. See infra Part II.B.
17. See infra Part II.
18. See infra Part III.B.
19. See infra Part III.B.
20. See infra Part III.B.
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I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE DUTY ELEMENT
While the duty element in many negligence cases is easily established,
there remains a set of negligence claims in which the duty question is harder
to answer. One such example is when a nontraditional patient sues a
healthcare professional for care that was indirectly received.21 In these cases,
defendants commonly argue there is no valid claim against them because
there was no duty of care.22 Two issues that raise these unique duty questions
are curbside consultations and when physicians are on call.23
Physicians and patients traditionally interact in direct care settings. In a
typical scenario, a patient: (1) makes an appointment or is referred to a
physician; (2) is then diagnosed, treated, medicated, or operated on by the
physician; and (3) is ultimately billed by the physician for the services
provided. Sometimes, the patient may suffer from an injury due to a
wrongful diagnosis, improper treatment, or failure of the physician to provide
an essential service. In these situations, it is often obvious that the physician
owed a duty of care to the patient, either because there was a clear physicianpatient relationship or because it was foreseeable that the care could harm the
patient if provided negligently.24
Not all claims against physicians arise out of direct care. Increasingly,
physicians influence the care a patient receives through nontraditional
interactions. They may perform curbside consultations when contacted by a
colleague for an informal consult.25 They may be affiliated with or provide
supervision to nurses, residents, or other physicians.26 Physicians may also
perform independent medical examinations at the request of a third party.27
Based on these circumstances, nontraditional patients may be inclined to sue
these physicians for the indirect care provided to them if they are allegedly
harmed. But, whether a duty of care exists between physicians and
nontraditional patients is resoundingly unclear.28 Thus, this section provides
legal background on how courts have historically dealt with determining
whether the physician owes a duty of care to a patient in a nontraditional
health care setting.

21. See Mead v. Legacy Health Sys., 283 P.3d 904, 909 (Or. 2012) (en banc).
22. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Decatur Mem’l Hosp., 660 N.E.2d 235, 238–39 (Ill. App. Ct.
1996); Irvin v. Smith, 31 P.3d 934, 940 (Kan. 2001). See generally Hill ex rel. Burston v.
Kokosky, 463 N.W.2d 265 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990); Warren v. Dinter, 926 N.W.2d 370 (Minn.
2019).
23. See infra Part II.
24. See Mead, 283 P.3d at 909 (“When a patient goes to a doctor’s office and the doctor
examines the patient, ordinarily no one disputes that an implied agreement to provide medical
care has been formed and that consequently an implied physician-patient relationship arises.”).
25. See infra Part I.C.1.
26. See infra Part I.C.2.
27. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
28. See infra Part I.A.
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A. The Hurdle: Establishing a Duty of Care
Patients alleging injuries negligently29 caused by their physicians typically
bring medical malpractice claims.30 Originally a contract action, medical
malpractice is now considered a subset of negligence law.31 Therefore, a
medical malpractice claim requires: (1) a duty of care owed by the defendant
to the plaintiff, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) an injury, and (4) actual and
proximate causation.32
The requirements for medical malpractice claims differ from ordinary
negligence actions because of the specialized skills and expertise that
physicians possess.33 Thus, “conduct may be deemed malpractice, rather
than negligence, when it ‘constitutes medical treatment or bears a substantial
relationship to the rendition of medical treatment by a licensed physician.’”34
For example, expert testimony is necessary in medical malpractice cases to
determine whether a breach occurred due to physicians’ unique skills, which
laypersons do not ordinarily possess.35 More significantly, the duty element
in medical malpractice claims often requires the showing of a physicianpatient relationship.36 For a nontraditional patient to bring a viable claim
against a physician, the patient must first establish that a duty of care
existed.37

29. Sharon M. Glenn, Note, Liability in the Absence of a Traditional Physician-Patient
Relationship: What Every “On Call” Doctor Should Know: Mozingo v. Pitt County
Memorial Hospital, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 747, 752 (1993).
30. See Patrick D. Blake, Note, Redefining Physicians’ Duties: An Argument for
Eliminating the Physician-Patient Relationship Requirement in Actions for Medical
Malpractice, 40 GA. L. REV. 573, 575 (2006).
31. Glenn, supra note 29, at 752; see J. Gregory Lennon, Comment, Easing the Medical
Malpractice Crisis: Restricting the Creation of Duty Through an Implied Doctor-Patient
Relationship, 7 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 363, 364 (2004) (“Originally, ‘medical
malpractice was recognized as a legal wrong before the rise of negligence as a separate tort
and the development of modern contract principles,’ but today it is somewhat of a hybrid of
contract and tort theories.” (quoting Corbet v. McKinney, 980 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Mo. Ct. App.
1998))).
32. Jennings v. Badgett, 230 P.3d 861, 865 (Okla. 2010).
33. See Gilinsky v. Indelicato, 894 F. Supp. 86, 94 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (“[T]he theory of
simple negligence does not require the existence of a physician-patient relationship.”).
34. Scott v. Uljanov, 541 N.E.2d 398, 399 (N.Y. 1989) (quoting Bleiler v. Bodnar, 479
N.E.2d 230, 234 (N.Y. 1985)).
35. Blake, supra note 30, at 576 (“Imposing this different, and usually heightened,
standard of care on physicians is grounded in the assumption that the public relies upon and
trusts physicians’ opinions to a greater degree than they do nonphysicians’ opinions because
physicians have technical expertise that is not easily comprehended by the general public.”).
36. See Reynolds v. Decatur Mem’l Hosp., 660 N.E.2d 235, 238–39 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996);
Irvin v. Smith, 31 P.3d 934, 940 (Kan. 2001); Hill ex rel. Burston v. Kokosky, 463 N.W.2d
265, 266 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990).
37. JOHN C. P. GOLDBERG ET AL., TORT LAW: RESPONSIBILITY AND REDRESS 74–76 (4th
ed. 2016).
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1. The Rule: A Physician-Patient Relationship
Many states require the patient to establish the existence of a physicianpatient relationship in medical malpractice actions.38 A physician-patient
relationship is a consensual relationship whereby a patient “knowingly seeks
the assistance of the physician and the physician knowingly accepts [them]
as a patient.”39 This relationship is either express or implied.40
The physician-patient relationship is traditionally formed when the
physician acts for the benefit of the patient or with the patient’s express or
implied consent.41 The professional duty of a physician is “to bring skill and
care to the amelioration of the condition” of the patient and this duty “has its
foundation in public considerations that are inseparable from the nature and
exercise of his calling.”42 This is a fiduciary relationship based on “the
notion that the physician is learned, skillful, and experienced in an area of
which the patient knows little, but which is of the most vital importance to
him.”43 But this duty is limited to injuries inflicted within the scope of the
professional relationship.44
The traditional definition of a physician-patient relationship often does not
encompass nontraditional interactions between physicians and patients,
including care given by on-call physicians and curbside consultations.45
Despite suffering serious injuries, plaintiffs may be unable to seek redress
from these physicians because they cannot satisfy the duty element as
traditionally conceived.46 Courts that recognize such claims more carefully
assess whether they should deviate from their traditional understanding of a
physician-patient relationship or find a duty of care notwithstanding the lack
of such a physician-patient relationship.47

38. See supra note 36.
39. Kim Baker, United States: A Doctor’s Legal Duty—Erosion of the Curbside
Consultant, MONDAQ (Nov. 5, 2003), https://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/professionalnegligence/23193/a-doctors-legal-dutyerosion-of-the-curbside-consultant [https://perma.cc/
G8PT-HD3G].
40. Id.
41. Adams v. Via Christi Reg’l Med. Ctr., 19 P.3d 132, 140 (Kan. 2001); Kelley v. Middle
Tenn. Emergency Physicians, P.C., 133 S.W.3d 587, 593 (Tenn. 2004).
42. Lennon, supra note 31, at 365 (quoting James L. Rigelhaupt, Annotation, What
Constitutes Physician–Patient Relationships for Malpractice Purposes, 17 A.L.R. 4th 132 § 2
(1982)).
43. Id. (quoting DAVID M. HARNEY, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 6–7 (1973)).
44. Nash v. Royster, 127 S.E. 356, 359 (N.C. 1925) (stating that a physician is “not bound
to render professional services to everyone who applies, and he may therefore, by notice or
special agreement, limit the extent and scope of his employment”).
45. See generally Oliver v. Brock, 342 So. 2d 1 (Ala. 1976).
46. See id. at 4.
47. See generally Diggs v. Ariz. Cardiologists, Ltd., 8 P.3d 386 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000);
Corbet v. McKinney, 980 S.W.2d 166 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998); Lownsbury v. VanBuren, 762
N.E.2d 354 (Ohio 2002).
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2. Qualification to the Rule: Implied Relationships
Modern courts are applying a more nuanced analysis to determine whether
physician-patient relationships exist in medical malpractice cases.48
Specifically, they are analyzing whether an implied physician-patient
relationship exists.49 But courts differ in their definitions of what constitutes
an implied relationship.50 Many courts have found that a relationship may
exist when a physician accepts or undertakes to treat a patient, regardless of
whether they explicitly said or thought they were doing so.51 But the
question of whether a duty is created implicitly by a physician’s actions in
the course of providing care in nontraditional settings is often challenging to
answer.52
An implied relationship is “inferred by the courts from the actions of the
parties or the terms of employment.”53 Traditionally, courts determined
physician-patient relationships based on the physician’s affirmative actions
treating the patient or prescribing a course of treatment.54 Thus, in cases
involving implied physician-patient relationships, the question often
becomes whether the physician took any affirmative action indicating that
they accepted the individual as a patient.55 Some courts have held that
affirmative actions include those that involve examining, diagnosing, or
treating a patient.56
3. Exceptions to the Rule: A Duty of Care Despite No Relationship
While some courts are addressing this duty question by expanding the
scope of the physician-patient relationship, other courts have held that a duty
of care may exist notwithstanding the absence of such a relationship.57 Some
jurisdictions do not require the showing of a physician-patient relationship.58
Defendants who neither committed affirmative acts nor caused harm usually
48. See Glenn, supra note 29, at 747–48.
49. See cases cited infra notes 55–56.
50. See infra Part II.A.1.
51. See generally Corbet, 980 S.W.2d 166; Lownsbury, 762 N.E.2d 354.
52. See Lennon, supra note 31, at 367.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See Lopez v. Aziz, 852 S.W.2d 303, 306 (Tex. App. 1993) (holding that one telephone
call between the consulting physician and the treating physician did not form the basis for a
physician-patient relationship because the consulting physician did not perform any services,
such as conducting or reviewing lab tests).
56. Compare Oliver v. Brock, 342 So. 2d 1, 5 (Ala. 1976) (holding that the consulting
physician did not take any part in the treatment of the patient), and Corbet, 980 S.W.2d at 169
(observing that liability depends on whether a physician undertakes to examine, diagnose, or
treat a patient), with Raptis-Smith v. St. Joseph’s Med. Ctr., 755 N.Y.S.2d 384, 386 (App. Div.
2003) (holding that to give rise to an implied relationship, it is not necessary for a consultant
to “see, examine, take a history, or treat the patient”).
57. See generally Gilinsky v. Indelicato, 894 F. Supp. 86 (E.D.N.Y. 1995); Diggs v. Ariz.
Cardiologists, Ltd., 8 P.3d 386 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000); Millard v. Corrado, 14 S.W.3d 42 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1999); Mozingo ex rel. Thomas v. Pitt Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 415 S.E.2d 341
(N.C. 1992).
58. See cases cited supra note 57.
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are not expected to take affirmative steps to protect others, unless an
exception applies.59 These exceptions include: (1) when physicians provide
medical advice or care to someone who was not previously their patient,60
(2) when physicians create an unreasonable risk,61 and (3) when physicians
act in nonmedical situations that do not involve professional judgment.62
Within these exceptions, physicians may be under a duty of care to
nontraditional patients despite the absence of a physician-patient
relationship.63
Physicians may owe a nontraditional patient a duty of care if their words
or conduct indicate that they intend to provide medical advice or attention to
a person who was not previously their patient.64 The basis for this comes
from the Restatement (Second), section 324A, which states:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services
to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a
third person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for
physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to
protect his undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise reasonable care
increases the risk of such harm, or . . . (c) the harm is suffered because of
reliance of the other or third person upon the undertaking.65

Courts have found that physicians are in a unique position to prevent future
harm to patients and nonpatients given their superior knowledge and
experience.66 Thus, a court may, for instance, analyze whether a physician
was in the best position to impact the trajectory of the case in order to
determine whether a duty of care exists.67
Some courts apply an “undertaking analysis” when physicians perform
independent medical exams on nonpatients.68 For instance, physicians may
perform medical exams on prospective employees, prospective insurees, or
litigation claimants.69 Although physicians may be providing a service to the
examinee in this role, courts are hesitant to find that a physician-patient

59. See generally Adams v. Via Christi Reg’l Med. Ctr., 19 P.3d 132 (Kan. 2001).
60. See cases cited infra note 64.
61. See generally Smith v. Welch, 967 P.2d 727 (Kan. 1998); Eelbode v. Chec Med. Ctrs.,
Inc., 984 P.2d 436 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
62. See generally Taylor v. Smith, 892 So. 2d 887 (Ala. 2004); Cheeks v. Dorsey, 846 So.
2d 1169 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that there was a duty of care when a physician
gave methadone to a patient that was already on drugs, resulting in his incapacity, which
caused a vehicular crash and killed the plaintiff’s decedent and her daughter).
63. See infra Part I.A.3.
64. See generally Nold ex rel. Nold v. Binyon, 31 P.3d 274 (Kan. 2001); Fruiterman v.
Granata, 668 S.E.2d 127 (Va. 2008).
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (AM. L. INST. 1965).
66. See Green v. Walker, 910 F.2d 291, 295 (5th Cir. 1990).
67. See Diggs v. Ariz. Cardiologists, Ltd., 8 P.3d 386, 390 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000).
68. See Stanley v. McCarver, 92 P.3d 849, 853 (Ariz. 2004) (en banc) (finding that the
physician contracted with another to interpret plaintiff’s x-rays and in so doing, “he undertook
a professional obligation with respect to Ms. Stanley’s physical wellbeing”).
69. See Blake, supra note 30, at 613.
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relationship existed.70 Nonetheless, an examinee may be harmed as a result
of the physician’s action or inaction.71 A physician may have failed to
diagnose a serious condition,72 failed to advise the plaintiff of a serious
condition that was accurately diagnosed,73 or reached an incorrect conclusion
in the examination that led to the plaintiff’s economic loss.74 Thus, by
agreeing to perform an examination on behalf of a third party, the physician
may be considered to have undertaken the task of providing reasonable
care.75 Thus, there may be a duty of care notwithstanding a lack of showing
of a physician-patient relationship.76
Physicians have also been liable when their affirmative acts created
unreasonable risks.77 If a duty of care is found in these cases, the physician
owes a common-law duty of reasonable care to the plaintiff.78 For example,
in HealthONE v. Rodriguez ex rel. Rodriguez,79 a physician left phenol—a
drug that, when injected, destroys human tissue—on a cart with nerve block
medicines that would be injected intravenously.80 Another physician
mistakenly picked up the phenol and injected it into a patient, who
subsequently suffered serious brain damage.81 The court held that the first
physician owed a common-law duty of reasonable care to the patient given
that the actions led to the creation of harm.82
Plaintiffs may also bring an ordinary negligence claim when a physician
creates unreasonable risks to those outside the bounds of any potential
physician-patient relationship. For example, a patient may drive dangerously
and put others on the road at risk due to the side effects of medication the
physician prescribed.83 Additionally, a physician’s failure to inform others
about a patient’s contagious disease may lead to others contracting that
disease.84
70. See Lee v. City of New York, 560 N.Y.S.2d 700, 701 (App. Div. 1990) (asserting that
the “physician-patient relationship does not exist if the physician is retained solely to examine
an employee on behalf of an employer”).
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See Ervin v. Am. Guardian Life Assurance Co., 545 A.2d 354, 355 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1988).
74. See Ney v. Axelrod, 723 A.2d 719, 721 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999).
75. See Hoover v. Williamson, 203 A.2d 861, 863 (Md. 1964) (holding that a physician
who had examined an employee for an employer and affirmatively advised the employee
wrongly had undertaken to provide care).
76. See id.
77. See generally Smith v. Welch, 967 P.2d 727 (Kan. 1998); Eelbode v. Chec Med. Ctrs.,
Inc., 984 P.2d 436 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
78. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
79. 50 P.3d 879 (Colo. 2002).
80. Id. at 885.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., Taylor v. Smith, 892 So. 2d 887 (Ala. 2004); Cheeks v. Dorsey, 846 So. 2d
1169 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
84. See, e.g., DiMarco v. Lynch Homes–Chester Cnty., Inc., 583 A.2d 422 (Pa. 1990);
Estate of Amos v. Vanderbilt Univ., 62 S.W.3d 133 (Tenn. 2001) (holding that the hospital
owed a duty of care to the future husband of a patient to warn the patient that it had given her
HIV-contaminated blood).
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4. A Public Policy Approach
When faced with a difficult duty question, some courts apply a public
policy approach to determine whether a duty of care should exist as a matter
of law.85 An example comes from the California Supreme Court’s decision
in Rowland v. Christian.86 This case presented a nuanced duty question that
the court determined would not be properly addressed under the standard
doctrinal approach.87
In Rowland, the court did away with its previous tripartite premises
liability distinction and held one owes a general duty to anyone who is on
one’s property.88 As a general matter, landowners were required to use
ordinary care to prevent harm to others.89 Any departure from this default
rule required the balancing of seven policy factors.90 Since then, courts,
specifically California courts, have applied this approach to determine
whether a duty of care exists in other types of relationships that present
difficult duty questions, such as between nontraditional patients and
physicians.91 While some courts are creating very similar multifactor
balancing tests,92 others generally state that the presence or absence of a
physician-patient relationship is just one factor to consider when determining
the nature and scope of the duty owed.93 Thus, courts have begun to create
exceptions to the general requirement of a physician-patient relationship by
analyzing various policy considerations.94
B. Historical Treatment and Current Trends
Patients have historically had trouble raising claims arising from indirect
healthcare interactions because of the unclear duty question. However, as
medicine has undergone tremendous change, courts have also changed their
analyses and approaches in these cases.95 Part I.B.1 describes courts’
reluctance to extend the duty element in these cases and Part I.B.2 discusses
how and why courts began to engage with the duty question more
meaningfully.

85. See Blake, supra note 30, at 593.
86. 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968).
87. See generally id.
88. Id. at 569.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 564; see Blake, supra note 30, at 594.
91. See Blake, supra note 30, at 595. The California Supreme Court has applied this
approach to determine whether a duty of care exists between independent medical examiners
and nontraditional patients. See, e.g., James v. United States, 483 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Cal.
1980); Felton v. Schaeffer, 279 Cal. Rptr. 713 (Ct. App. 1991); Keene v. Wiggins, 138 Cal.
Rptr. 3 (Ct. App. 1977).
92. See, e.g., Stanley v. McCarver, 92 P.3d 849 (Ariz. 2004); Reed v. Bojarski, 764 A.2d
433 (N.J. 2001).
93. See, e.g., Meena v. Wilburn, 603 So. 2d 866, 869–70 (Miss. 1992).
94. See cases cited supra notes 92–93.
95. See Blake, supra note 30, at 577.
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1. Historical Reluctance to Extend the Duty Element
Historically, many patients could not bring cases against physicians in
nontraditional care settings due to the limitations on the duty element.96
Courts often did not recognize a duty of care in these cases because there was
no established physician-patient relationship based on the circumstances.97
They restricted the definition of a physician-patient relationship to direct
contact with the patient,98 which included a physical examination of the
patient, knowing the patient’s name,99 having the patient referred to them,100
or performing tests on the patient.101
This narrow view is exemplified by Oliver v. Brock.102 In this case, the
patient was admitted to a hospital following a car accident and put under the
care of Dr. Whitfield and Dr. Ketcham.103 During the course of providing
care to the patient, Dr. Whitfield called Dr. Brock, a physician in another
city, to discuss the care and treatment of another one of her patients.104 While
speaking on the phone, Dr. Whitfield also mentioned the plaintiff’s case and
current treatment, and Dr. Brock expressed his general agreement with Dr.
Whitfield’s treatment plan.105 Following the call, Dr. Whitfield made note
of the conversation in the patient’s discharge summary, along with the
general suggestions Dr. Brock made during their conversation.106 Despite
adherence to this treatment plan, the patient suffered serious injuries.107
The Alabama Supreme Court found that Dr. Brock’s level of involvement
in the patient’s case was not sufficient to establish a physician-patient
relationship.108 Dr. Brock never saw the patient, requested to serve as a
consultant, or offered any treatment advice.109 Moreover, he received all
case information from the treating physician and spoke with the treating
physician during a phone conversation that originated while discussing
another patient’s treatment.110 Therefore, the court determined that Dr.
Brock’s conversation with the treating physician was “completely
gratuitous.”111 Because the court also deemed the existence of a physicianpatient relationship critical to the existence of a duty of care, it concluded
96. Baker, supra note 39.
97. See infra Part II.A.
98. See Mead v. Legacy Health Sys., 283 P.3d 904, 909 (Or. 2012).
99. See Ingber v. Kandler, 513 N.Y.S.2d 11, 11 (App. Div. 1987).
100. See Hill ex rel. Burston v. Kokosky, 463 N.W.2d 265, 266 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990).
101. See cases cited supra note 56.
102. 342 So. 2d 1 (Ala. 1976).
103. Id. at 2–3.
104. Id. at 4.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See id.
109. Id. at 4–5.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 4. If a physician renders services gratuitously, this does not create a duty to
exercise reasonable and ordinary care, skill, or diligence. Voss v. Bridwell, 364 P.2d 955, 963
(Kan. 1961).
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that the plaintiff had no negligence claim against the consulting physician as
a matter of law.112
Until the 1990s, courts were steadfast in limiting the definition of the
physician-patient relationship, reasoning that expanding liability would have
a chilling effect on the free flow of information between professionals.113
They also wanted to preserve the treating physician’s ultimate control over
the patient’s care and worried that recognizing the second physician’s
domain over the patient might obfuscate the primary physician-patient
relationship.114 Additionally, most courts believed that expanding the scope
of liability would stifle efforts to improve medical knowledge.115
2. Phase of Relaxation: The Current Approach
Although many courts were historically reluctant to extend liability to
physicians in nontraditional patient care settings, they are now examining the
possible merits of this expansion more closely.116 Some courts are treating
the existence of a physician-patient relationship as a matter of fact.117 Others
are determining whether, as a matter of law, a duty of care exists regardless
of whether the relationship is present.118
Today, several courts recognize that direct contact between the physician
and patient is not dispositive to whether a relationship exists.119 Several
other questions are now at the forefront of courts’ analyses, including: (1)
whether the physician interacted with the patient’s family member, even if
not with the patient herself; (2) whether a physician provided a service; and
(3) whether the physician acted affirmatively.120 The latter two questions, if
answered affirmatively, are sometimes said to create an implied

112. See Oliver, 342 So. 2d at 5.
113. See Hill ex rel. Burston v. Kokosky, 463 N.W.2d 265, 268 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990)
(“The extension of potential malpractice liability to doctors with whom a treating physician
has merely conferred, without more, would unacceptably inhibit the exchange of information
and expertise among physicians. This would benefit neither those seeking medical attention
nor the medical profession.”).
114. Baker, supra note 39.
115. Reynolds v. Decatur Mem’l Hosp., 660 N.E.2d 235, 240 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996)
(“Plaintiffs suggest that what needs to be done is to find a physician-patient relationship to
result from every such conversation. The consequence of such a rule would be significant. It
would have a chilling effect upon the practice of medicine. It would stifle communication,
education and professional association, all to the detriment of the patient. The likely effect in
adopting plaintiff’s argument also would be that such informal conferences would no longer
occur.”); see also Rainer v. Grossman, 107 Cal. Rptr. 469, 472 (App. Ct. 1973).
116. See infra Part II.
117. See infra Part II.A.1.
118. See Baker, supra note 39.
119. See Kelley v. Middle Tenn. Emergency Physicians, P.C., 133 S.W.3d 587, 593 (Tenn.
2004); St. John v. Pope, 901 S.W.2d 420, 424 (Tex. 1995).
120. See, e.g., Adams v. Via Christi Reg’l Med. Ctr., 19 P.3d 132, 140 (Kan. 2001). The
court held that a physician-patient relationship existed because the physician discussed the
patient’s condition with her mother and did not say he did not consider her daughter his patient.
Id. Instead, he listened to the patient’s mother and gave her his medical opinion in response.
Id. Thus, it was “immaterial that he did not speak directly to [the daughter].” Id.
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relationship.121 On the question of what constitutes a service or affirmative
act, courts’ analyses differ significantly.122 Accordingly, there are no
dispositive factors that create an implied relationship, and many courts do
not apply a stringent or uniform analysis.123
This phase of relaxation acknowledges that the previously unbending
approach of requiring a relationship is outdated, as more physicians
frequently interact with patients in nontraditional settings.124 Physicians, as
professionals and specialists, are in a unique position where they can directly
impact the health of an individual.125 Thus, it does not serve the patient, nor
arguably tort law, to make redress unavailable simply because an outdated
and narrow interpretation of physician-patient relationships shields
physicians from liability.
Patients are bringing both ordinary negligence and medical malpractice
claims against physicians.126 Courts have recognized that “when a risk of
harm has been identified through the exercise of medical judgment, a failure
to follow through by taking measures to prevent the harm may constitute
actionable ordinary negligence.”127 Thus, a plaintiff may bring an ordinary
negligence claim if the jury is able to evaluate the reasonableness of the
physician’s conduct based on their own common knowledge and everyday
experiences.128
In the last few decades, the delivery of healthcare services has changed,
requiring courts to redefine the physician-patient relationship and change
legal presumptions about duty.129 Medical advances have expanded the
ability of physicians to specialize in their practices, which may spur the need
for informal consultations.130 Technological innovations also allow
physicians and healthcare professionals to connect with each other
instantaneously.131 Patients in hospitals may be treated by large teams of
healthcare providers.132 Telemedicine, in which physicians provide services
121. See Meghan C. O’Connor, The Physician–Patient Relationship and the Professional
Standard of Care: Reevaluating Medical Negligence Principles to Achieve the Goals of Tort
Reform, 46 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 109, 112 (2010).
122. See generally Gilbert v. Miodovnik, 990 A.2d 983 (D.C. 2010); Jennings v. Badgett,
230 P.3d 861 (Okla. 2010).
123. See infra Part II.A.1.
124. Blake, supra note 30, at 613.
125. See generally Diggs v. Ariz. Cardiologists, Ltd., 8 P.3d 386 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000).
126. See, e.g., Gilinsky v. Indelicato, 894 F. Supp. 86 (E.D.N.Y. 1995); Sterling v. Johns
Hopkins Hosp., 802 A.2d 440 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002); Meena v. Wilburn, 603 So. 2d 866
(Miss. 1992); Millard v. Corrado, 14 S.W.3d 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
127. Gilinsky, 894 F. Supp. at 94 (quoting Miller v. Albany Med. Ctr. Hosp., 464 N.Y.S.2d
297, 299 (App. Div. 1983)).
128. See id.
129. See, e.g., Adams v. Via Christi Reg’l Med. Ctr., 19 P.3d 132 (Kan. 2001); Mead v.
Legacy Health Sys., 283 P.3d 904 (Or. 2012).
130. Mead, 283 P.3d at 910; Blake, supra note 30, at 613.
131. See Baker, supra note 39.
132. See Mozingo ex rel. Thomas v. Pitt Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 415 S.E.2d 341, 345
(N.C. 1992) (“In the delivery of health care services . . . it is increasingly difficult to determine
factually who is in control of whom . . . . [T]he matter of the right to control another’s actions
becomes a very difficult question both as a matter of fact and of law.”).
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through electronic communications, also involves complex interactions
between physicians and patients.133 Additionally, a physician’s contract with
a hospital or healthcare facility may count as an undertaking of a physicianpatient relationship with certain patients.134 Given such changes, many
courts are resolving the difficult determination of when the duty of care exists
in nontraditional settings.135
C. Scenarios Highlighting Differing Courts’ Analyses
As physicians interact with patients in nontraditional settings, courts must
determine when a physician owes a duty of care to a patient outside the scope
of a traditional physician-patient relationship. Key questions of duty arise
when physicians are on call or perform curbside consultations. In both sets
of cases, courts must determine the scope of the physician-patient
relationship, primarily by determining the bounds of an implied relationship.
They must also determine whether a duty of care can be established in the
absence of a physician-patient relationship.
1. Curbside Consultations
Curbside consultations, or informal consultations, occur when the treating
physician seeks informal advice about patient care.136 The consults are
usually based on the treater’s presentation of the case.137 The treating
physician typically offers only brief, simple, and nonspecific information to
the consulting physician, while the consulting physician usually does not
examine the patient, review or edit the patient’s chart, participate directly in
the care plan, or charge for the services performed.138 Unlike curbside
consultations, in formal consultations, the consulting physician may provide
any of the above services.139 These services generally point toward the
recognition of a duty of care between the physician and patient.140

133. Some states are codifying the definition of a physician-patient relationship by
statutorily requiring physicians to personally document the patient’s medical history and
perform a physical examination before forming a relationship. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 541821 (2020); S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-47-113 (2020) (stating that, for medical malpractice cases,
a physician-patient relationship is not formed when a physician provides a consultation to
another physician without seeing or examining the patient and without the expectation of
payment for the consultation).
134. See generally Lownsbury v. VanBuren, 762 N.E.2d 354 (Ohio 2002).
135. See Glenn, supra note 29, at 747.
136. See Curbside Consultations, supra note 13, at 51–52.
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See Thaddeus Mason Pope, Curbside Consults: New Liability Risks to Avoid When
You Are Not a Patient’s Physician, THE ASCO POST (June 25, 2019), https://www.
ascopost.com/issues/june-25-2019/new-liability-risks-to-avoid-when-you-are-not-a-patients-physician [https://perma.cc/A33R-EEAF].
140. See id.
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Curbside consultations are a recommended and valuable practice in the
medical community and benefit not only professionals but also patients.141
The free exchange of information and expertise among clinicians facilitates
communication and education.142 But if a patient is injured or harmed as a
result of or during a curbside consult, the chief course of redress is bringing
a negligence or medical malpractice action against both the treating and
consulting physician.143 However, courts have not clarified whether the
consulting physician may be held liable for the impact of an informal
consultation because the physician-patient relationship is hard to prove.144
In determining if an implied relationship exists, courts consider whether
the consultant went beyond giving general advice, whether a preexisting
contract between the consulting physician and hospital created the requisite
relationship, and whether the consultant’s expertise made it foreseeable that
the treating physician would rely on the consultant’s opinion.145 Other
jurisdictions determine whether a duty of care existed not on the basis of a
physician-patient relationship but on the basis of an undertaking, a creation
of unreasonable risk, or public policy.146 Regardless of the method of
analysis, courts are engaging in this complicated duty question.147
2. On-Call Physicians
Similar to curbside consultations, courts are divided as to when an on-call
physician can be held liable.148 “On call” is a status that many hospitals and
healthcare facilities use to indicate that a physician may be reached to treat
patients or answer any questions that physicians, residents, or nurses may
have during the course of their work.149 Hospitals and facilities generally
have rules governing their expectations for on-call physicians.150
Confusion arises when a physician is not physically located in the hospital
but is called for an opinion and a patient is ultimately injured.151 Sometimes
physicians may also be implicated if they are on call and supervising
residents.152 However, the mere fact that a physician is on call does not in
and of itself create a duty of care.153 Rather, evidence is necessary to show
141. See Douglas Mossman, Malpractice Rx: ‘Curbside’ Consults: Know Your Liability,
CURRENT PSYCHIATRY, June 2012, at 42, 42; Pope, supra note 139.
142. Pope, supra note 139.
143. Baker, supra note 39.
144. See infra Part II.A.1.
145. See Baker, supra note 39.
146. See infra Part II.B.
147. See Gilinsky v. Indelicato, 894 F. Supp. 86, 94 (E.D.N.Y. 1995); Irvin v. Smith, 31
P.3d 934, 940 (Kan. 2001); Cogswell ex rel. Cogswell v. Chapman, 672 N.Y.S.2d 460, 462
(App. Div. 1998); Jennings v. Badgett, 230 P.3d 861, 868 (Okla. 2010).
148. See supra Part I.C.1.
149. See Lennon, supra note 31, at 363–64.
150. See id; see also Glenn, supra note 29, at 747.
151. See Oja v. Kin, 581 N.W.2d 739, 742–43 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998); Lennon, supra note
31, at 367–68.
152. See Lennon, supra note 31, at 368.
153. See Mead v. Legacy Health Sys., 283 P.3d 904, 913 (Or. 2012).
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the on-call physician accepted responsibility for the patient.154 This is based
on the common-law notion that physicians are not bound to treat all patients
who are in need of medical attention.155
II. THE DIFFERING CASE LAW
As physicians more frequently perform services for patients and
nonpatients alike, it is increasingly unclear when and how a duty of care is
established between physicians and patients.156 Part II.A investigates the
existence of a duty of care for physicians providing curbside consultations.
Part II.B. analyzes the creation of the duty element when physicians are on
call.
A. Detailed Examination of Curbside Consultation Case Law
Because curbside consultations involve the informal exchange of
information between two physicians, it is difficult to determine when a duty
of care to the patient is created.157 Courts that conclude the duty element is
satisfied in such situations often either: (1) find an implied relationship by
expanding the scope of the physician-patient relationship158 or (2) find there
was an undertaking or the creation of risk or harm by the physician,
regardless of whether a physician-patient relationship existed.159
1. Qualification: An Affirmative Act
In curbside consult cases, many courts do not apply a standard test or
analyze a dispositive set of factors to determine whether an implied
physician-patient relationship exists.160 Instead, the critical question is
whether the physician affirmatively acted, such that they provided a service
to the patient.161 This requirement stems from the consensual nature of the
physician-patient relationship.162 Therefore, “where there is no ongoing
physician-patient relationship, the physician’s express or implied consent to
advise or treat the patient is required for the relationship to come into being.

154. See Glenn, supra note 29, at 766.
155. Id. at 763.
156. Blake, supra note 30, at 601.
157. See supra Part I.C.1.
158. See infra Part II.A.1.
159. See infra Part II.A.2.
160. See Gilinksy v. Indelicato, 894 F. Supp. 86, 93–94 (E.D.N.Y. 1995); Irvin v. Smith,
31 P.3d 934, 941 (Kan. 2001).
161. See Gilinsky, 894 F. Supp. at 94; Irvin, 31 P.3d at 941; Cogswell ex rel. Cogswell v.
Chapman, 672 N.Y.S.2d 460, 462 (App. Div. 1998) (holding that a “doctor-patient
relationship can be established by a telephone call when such a call ‘affirmatively advis[es] a
prospective patient as to a course of treatment’ and it is foreseeable that the patient would rely
on the advice’” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Miller v. Sullivan, 625
N.Y.S.2d 102, 104 (App. Div. 1995))); Jennings v. Badgett, 230 P.3d 861, 868 (Okla. 2010).
162. See Adams v. Via Christi Reg’l Med. Ctr., 19 P.3d 132, 140 (Kan. 2001); Lopez v.
Aziz, 852 S.W.2d 303, 306–07 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993).
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Stated otherwise, the doctor must take some affirmative action with regard
to treatment of a patient.”163
There is no universal definition for what constitutes a sufficient affirmative
act. Courts often consider whether a physician examined, diagnosed, treated,
or charged for their services.164 If a physician does none of these, it is likely
that the physician did not provide services to a patient.165 It is unclear,
though, whether completing just one of these acts would be sufficient to
establish a relationship. Some specific actions that may be significant
include physically examining the patient, reviewing the patient’s hospital
chart, ordering tests, reviewing tests, or providing recommendations that
cannot be ignored.166
Given the unclear meaning of affirmative action, courts disagree about
whether a consulting physician who only provides advice to a treating
physician has affirmatively acted and created an implied physician-patient
relationship.167 Many courts find that without any other service or act,
merely providing advice, which the treating physician is free to accept or
reject, is not an affirmative act.168 However, embedded in this analysis are
principles of foreseeability, reliance, and the formation of an undertaking.169
a. Providing Advice Is a Sufficient Affirmative Act
A few courts purport to hold that providing advice alone is sufficient to
establish affirmative action.170 Specifically, these courts hold that when a
consulting physician advises as to the patient’s treatment and the treatment
actually causes further injuries, a relationship may be found between the
physician and the patient.171
In Gilinsky v. Indelicato,172 a patient suffered a stroke while under the care
of Dr. Parks, who was enrolled in a postdoctoral chiropractic neurology
residency program.173 Dr. Indelicato was the senior neurologist assigned to
monitor Dr. Parks.174 Dr. Parks called Dr. Indelicato about a patient with
unusual symptoms, informing Dr. Indelicato of the patient’s vital signs and
163. Adams, 19 P.3d at 140.
164. See Corbet v. McKinney, 980 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
165. See Jennings, 230 P.3d at 867.
166. See, e.g., Ingber v. Kandler, 513 N.Y.S.2d 11, 11 (App. Div. 1987) (holding there was
no relationship because the physician did not contact the patient or see any of the patient’s
records).
167. Compare Gilinksy v. Indelicato, 894 F. Supp. 86, 93–94 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), with Irvin
v. Smith, 31 P.3d 934, 941 (Kan. 2001).
168. See infra Part II.A.1.c.2.
169. See infra Part II.A.1.c.2.
170. See, e.g., Gilinksy, 894 F. Supp. at 93–94; Adams v. Via Christi Reg’l Med. Ctr., 19
P.3d 132, 140 (Kan. 2001) (“A physician-patient relationship may be created in any number
of ways, including the act of a physician agreeing to give or giving advice to a patient in person
or by telephone.”).
171. See infra note 208 and accompanying text.
172. 894 F. Supp. 86 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
173. Id. at 87.
174. Id.
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symptoms after a chiropractic manipulation.175 Dr. Indelicato believed the
patient was suffering from cervical disequilibrium and instructed Dr. Parks
to perform some tests, which Dr. Parks then completed.176 Over the next few
hours, Dr. Parks and Dr. Indelicato had six other phone calls, three of which
Dr. Indelicato initiated.177 During the course of the thirty-eight minute
combined consultation, Dr. Parks did not tell Dr. Indelicato about the
plaintiff’s full medical history, did not identify her by name, and did not
forward any records for review, nor did Dr. Indelicato bill for his services.178
The court held that at some point, Dr. Parks ceased to seek consultative
advice; rather, he sought actual direction from Dr. Indelicato.179 The court
found that Dr. Indelicato, in providing advice to Dr. Parks, exercised his
professional judgment in a matter bearing directly on the plaintiff.180
Therefore, while Dr. Indelicato did not physically examine the patient,
review the patient’s entire medical history, or bill for his services, the court
still found a relationship on the basis of his advice—which included a
proffered diagnosis as well as subsequent treatment instructions and
persuasive direction.181
While the court here found a physician-patient relationship because the
consulting physician affirmatively advised on a patient’s case, other
affirmative acts were imbedded in this advice, including diagnosing and
creating a treatment plan for the patient.182 Therefore, it is not the giving
advice itself that is the impactful act; it is the impact of that advice on the
patient’s examination, diagnosis, or treatment that seems to create the
relationship.
b. Providing Advice Alone Is Not a Sufficient Affirmative Act
By contrast, many courts have held that conversations between a
consulting physician and a treating physician regarding a specific patient’s
case “even when the treating physician relies on the [consulting] physician’s
opinion, without more, is insufficient to establish a physician-patient
relationship.”183 Thus, in the absence of a physician examining, diagnosing,
treating, or charging a patient for any services, simply providing advice to a
colleague would not be a sufficient affirmative act.
For instance, in Irvin v. Smith,184 a patient brought a medical malpractice
action after an undiagnosed ventriculoperitoneal shunt malfunction caused
permanent brain damage.185 The patient suffered from seizures, nausea,
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id. at 88.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 93–94.
Id.
Id. at 88, 93–94.
See id. at 94.
Jennings v. Badgett, 230 P.3d 861, 868 (Okla. 2010).
31 P.3d 934 (Kan. 2001).
Id. at 938.
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vomiting, and neck and back pain in connection with the malfunctioning
shunt.186 Dr. Smith, a pediatric intensivist, called Dr. Gilmartin for a
“neurological consult” because Dr. Smith thought Dr. Gilmartin was “the
best consultant” to evaluate the patient.187 The two physicians discussed
performing a shuntogram,188 after which Dr. Smith ordered a shuntogram
and EEG for the next day.189 The next morning, the patient’s condition
deteriorated and the shuntogram was performed.190 However, the patient
suffered permanent brain damage and alleged that the delay in performing
the shuntogram constituted negligence by both physicians.191
The court found there was no relationship between Dr. Smith and the
patient.192 Although the physicians jointly developed the patient’s treatment
plan, the court differentiated the consultant’s call from a formal
consultation.193 The consultant did not examine the patient, review her
hospital chart, or speak with her or her parents.194 He also did not enter any
orders and only discussed the case in general terms with the treating
physician, agreeing to a consult the next day.195 The court held that agreeing
to consult the next day, by itself, does not create a physician-patient
relationship.196 Thus, the giving of advice alone was not a sufficient
affirmative act.
In Hill ex rel. Burston v. Kokosky,197 a mother gave birth to an infant with
cerebral palsy and brought a medical malpractice suit against the consulting
doctors who provided advice on child birthing alternatives.198 The
consulting doctors spoke with the treating physician over the phone and gave
their opinions based on the case history the treating physician had relayed to
them.199 The treating physician did not refer to the patient by name and
neither defendant contacted the patient, examined her, or reviewed her
chart.200 The court found no relationship between the physicians and the
patient because: (1) neither defendant knew the patient; (2) neither defendant
examined the patient; (3) neither defendant spoke with the patient; (4) the
patient was not referred to the defendants for treatment or consultation; (5)
the defendants’ medical opinions were addressed directly to the treating
186. Id.
187. Id. at 938–39.
188. “A shuntogram is a procedure which involves injection of a radioactive isotope into
the shunt to check for shunt blockage.” Id. at 939.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 940.
193. Id. at 948 (Lockett, J., dissenting) (noting the majority’s statement that a formal
consultation includes a full bedside review of the case and a physical examination of the
patient, which had not taken place in this case).
194. Id. at 942–43.
195. Id. at 943.
196. Id.
197. 463 N.W.2d 265 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990).
198. Id. at 266.
199. Id.
200. Id.
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physician as a colleague; and (6) their opinions were in the form of a
recommendation to be accepted or rejected by the plaintiff’s treating doctor
as he saw fit.201
The court opined that the physicians did not prescribe a course of treatment
to the patient.202 Instead, they provided recommendations that the treating
doctor could have accepted or rejected.203 The court compared this act to
one where a treating doctor consults a medical article or treatise for advice.204
The above cases hold that providing advice alone is not a sufficient
affirmative act.205 The courts mentioned possible services that could create
a relationship, including directly or physically examining the patient,
ordering tests, reviewing specific test results, preparing reports, or viewing
the entire patient chart.206 While these courts outlined acts that were missing
from the incidences at hand, it remains unclear which, if any, of these
services would be dispositive to the creation of a relationship.207
c. Application of Negligence Principles
While some courts differ as to whether providing advice to another
colleague is sufficient to constitute an affirmative act, courts do not focus
exclusively on this question.208 Such courts use other principles of
negligence, such as foreseeability, reliance, and undertaking, to determine
whether an affirmative act occurred and created an implied relationship.209
Some courts grapple with whether it is reasonably foreseeable that a
patient may be injured as a result of the consulting physician’s actions.210
They take into account “the likelihood of injury, the magnitude of the burden
of guarding against it, and the consequences of placing that burden on the
defendant.”211 While foreseeability alone is not sufficient to establish a
relationship, it is a relevant factor in determining whether an implied
physician-patient relationship exists.

201. Id. at 267.
202. Id.
203. Id.; see also NBD Bank, N.A. Tr. Div. ex rel. Rountree v. Barry, 566 N.W.2d 47, 49
(Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
204. See Hill, 463 N.W.2d at 267.
205. See id.; see also Irvin v. Smith, 31 P.3d 934, 941 (Kan. 2001).
206. See cases cited supra note 205.
207. See cases cited supra note 205.
208. Courts also consider the length of the conversation between physicians, the number
of calls, who contacted whom, and whether the physician knew the name of the patient. See
Gilinsky v. Indelicato, 894 F. Supp. 86, 93 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that a relationship did
exist because “the nature of the consultation . . . was not fleeting and informal . . . but rather
was continuous, and substantial, spanning . . . approximately 38 minutes”); NBD Bank, 566
N.W.2d at 49; Ingber v. Kandler, 513 N.Y.S.2d 11, 11 (App. Div. 1987).
209. See Gilinsky, 894 F. Supp. at 94. See generally Bovara v. St. Francis Hosp., 700
N.E.2d 143 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998); Corbet v. McKinney, 980 S.W.2d 166 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
210. See, e.g., Bovara, 700 N.E.2d at 146.
211. See Reynolds v. Decatur Mem’l Hosp., 660 N.E.2d 235, 239 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
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For instance, in Bovara v. St. Francis Hospital,212 the family of a patient
who died after receiving an angioplasty brought a medical malpractice action
against the physicians and the hospital.213 The patient met with the treating
physician at the hospital because of the patient’s heart disease214 and brought
the results of a previous angiogram of his coronary blood vessels with him.215
The treating physician was not trained in reading angiograms or in
performing angioplasties. He therefore gave the patient’s angiogram to Drs.
Edgett and Bliley, two cardiac interventionists at the hospital, who then
reviewed the angiogram.216 The treating physician was told that the
interventionists believed the patient could have an angioplasty, news the
treating physician then relayed to the patient.217 The patient later died during
the procedure.218
In considering the reasonable foreseeability of the patient’s injury, the
court asked whether the consulting physicians knew or should have known
that the treating physician and the patient would rely on their opinions and
advice.219 The court held that the defendant cardiac interventionists “knew
or should have known” that: (1) the treating cardiologist was not trained to
read angiograms; (2) their medical opinions would be transmitted to the
patient; and (3) their medical opinions were critical in deciding the patient’s
treatment plan, specifically whether or not to undergo an angioplasty.220
Thus, reasonable foreseeability and reliance helped determine whether an
implied physician-patient relationship existed between the consulting
physicians and the patient.221
Additionally, some courts consider whether the consulting physician
undertook to advise the treating physician in such a way that the treating
physician would rely on the recommendation or opinion, thus increasing the
risk of harm.222 Where there is such reliance, courts sometimes find an
implied relationship.223 The key consideration in these cases is whether the
treating physician was free to accept or reject the recommendations given by
the consultant.224
In Corbet v. McKinney,225 a patient was treated by an emergency room
physician, Dr. Ockner.226 While treating the patient, Dr. Ockner called Dr.
212. 700 N.E.2d 143 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998).
213. Id. at 145–46.
214. Id. at 144.
215. Id. at 144–45.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 146.
219. Id.
220. See id. at 147–48.
221. See id.
222. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Decatur Mem’l Hosp., 660 N.E.2d 235, 239 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996);
Irvin v. Smith, 31 P.3d 934, 951–52 (Kan. 2001); Corbet v. McKinney, 980 S.W.2d 166, 170
(Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
223. See cases cited supra note 222.
224. See cases cited supra note 222.
225. 980 S.W.2d 166 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
226. Id. at 168.
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McKinney, an ear, nose, and throat specialist.227 Dr. Ockner presented the
patient’s case to Dr. McKinney over the phone and provided details about the
complaints in her medical chart.228 Dr. McKinney stated that he had a case
or two similar to the patient’s and that he believed it was “usually a viral
illness.”229 Dr. Ockner did not ask Dr. McKinney to examine the patient
while she was in the emergency room.230 Dr. Ockner diagnosed and treated
the patient for acute labyrinthitis and told the patient to follow up with Dr.
McKinney in two days.231 Dr. McKinney did not receive a phone call from
Dr. Ockner about the patient, nor did he ever speak with or examine the
patient.232 The patient subsequently suffered permanent deafness in her right
ear and alleged that Dr. McKinney’s failure to properly diagnose her led to
the injury.233
The court found that Dr. McKinney did not have a physician-patient
relationship with the patient because he “merely [undertook] to advise the
patient’s treating physician,” had “no explicit contractual obligation to the
patient, treating physician, or treating hospital to provide care,” and did “not
take actions which indicate knowing consent to treat a patient who has sought
that treatment.”234 Dr. McKinney did not meet, speak with, examine, or
diagnose the patient.235 Instead, he “only offered a recommendation for
treatment which was addressed directly to Dr. Ockner as a colleague and not
indirectly to [the] patient.”236 Nothing suggests that the defendant knew
whether his recommendation would be followed, and Dr. Ockner was free to
accept or reject Dr. McKinney’s recommendation at his discretion.237 Thus,
Dr. McKinney did not undertake to provide care, because Dr. Ockner did not
rely on his expertise, such that it could give rise to future harm to the
patient.238
This case demonstrates how courts apply principles of reliance and
undertaking to determine whether a physician-patient relationship exists.239
Therefore, while the affirmative act requirement is imperative to most courts’
analyses, many are informed equally by negligence principles.
2. Exception: A Duty of Care Despite No Relationship
While some courts are redefining the physician-patient relationship, others
are extending physician liability by finding a duty of care regardless of

227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 170.
Id. at 171.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 170.
See id.
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whether a relationship exists.240 Thus, patients are also bringing ordinary
negligence claims against physicians for incidents involving medical care.241
In some medical malpractice cases, a duty of care is found not on the basis
of a physician-patient relationship but on the basis of an undertaking, a
degree of reliance, or the creation of unreasonable risk.242 Regardless of
whether the duty question is analyzed by determining whether an implied
physician-patient relationship exists, the analysis for establishing that
relationship is one in the same with ordinary negligence duty analysis in that
both emphasize principles of foreseeability, reliance, and undertakings as
predicates for a duty of care.243
a. Undertaking, Reliance, and the Creation of Risk
In Diggs v. Arizona Cardiologists, Ltd.,244 the court found that a
cardiologist who had “informally” consulted with a physician had a duty of
care to the patient because of the risk of harm created to the patient and the
primary physician’s reliance on the cardiologist’s opinion and
interpretation.245 One day, Mrs. Diggs had severe chest pain and arrived at
the hospital, where she met with an emergency room physician, Dr.
Johnson.246 Dr. Johnson took her medical history, examined her, and ordered
an electrocardiogram (“EKG”) and an echocardiogram.247 Although the
EKG suggested otherwise, Dr. Johnson believed the patient was suffering
from pericarditis.248 However, because Dr. Johnson was not trained to
interpret echocardiograms, he could not complete his differential
diagnosis.249 He briefly discussed Mrs. Diggs’ case with Dr. Valdez,250 a
cardiologist who was visiting another patient in the emergency room.251 Dr.
Johnson presented Mrs. Diggs’ clinical history and the results of the physical
exam, which Dr. Valdez reviewed before interpreting the EKG results.252
Accordingly, Dr. Valdez agreed with Dr. Johnson that the patient should be
discharged and that her pericarditis should be treated with a nonsteroidal anti-

240. See Gilinsky v. Indelicato, 894 F. Supp. 86, 94 (E.D.N.Y. 1995); Diggs v. Ariz.
Cardiologists, Ltd., 8 P.3d 386, 387 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000).
241. See generally Gilinsky, 894 F. Supp. 86.
242. See cases cited supra note 240.
243. See cases cited supra notes 222, 240.
244. 8 P.3d 386 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000).
245. See id. at 389–91.
246. Id. at 387.
247. Id.
248. Pericarditis is an inflammation of the sac around the heart. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 388. Dr. Valdez was not the on-call cardiologist at the time of the consultation.
Id. Dr. Johnson merely saw Dr. Valdez attending to another patient and informally consulted
with him about Mrs. Diggs. See id.
251. Id.
252. Id.

2020]

ACTION, AFFILIATION, AND A DUTY OF CARE

325

inflammatory medication.253 Three hours after being discharged, Mrs. Diggs
died of cardiopulmonary arrest.254
The court found that Dr. Valdez, the consulting physician, owed a duty of
care to Mrs. Diggs in a medical malpractice action because he created an
unreasonable risk to her life.255 The court noted that Dr. Valdez voluntarily
undertook a duty of care to the patient because his opinion and interpretation
of the EKG were the primary factors that led to the primary physician’s
diagnosis and treatment plan.256 By his negligent undertaking, Dr. Valdez
increased the risk of harm to Mrs. Diggs.257 Even though Dr. Valdez acted
under a gratuitous agreement with Dr. Johnson, he still owed a duty of care
to Mrs. Diggs.258 Dr. Valdez was in a unique position to prevent future harm
to the patient because Dr. Johnson was not fully qualified to interpret the
EKG; thus, he relied on Dr. Valdez’s interpretation and diagnosis.259 As
such, the court found that Dr. Valdez undertook to give treatment advice to
Dr. Johnson knowing that he would rely on his advice.260
b. Viability of Ordinary Negligence Claims
By analyzing the duty element regardless of whether a physician-patient
relationship exists, courts are recognizing the viability of ordinary negligence
claims.261 In doing so, courts ask whether the physician was in a unique
position to prevent future harm to the patient given the physician’s superior
knowledge and experience.262
In Gilinsky, the court held that the duty element in the ordinary negligence
claim was fulfilled because the physician attempted to “rescue” the
plaintiff.263 When a risk of harm has been identified through the exercise of
medical judgment, a failure to follow through with measures to prevent the
harm may constitute actionable ordinary negligence.264 Here, the court
concluded that a reasonable jury could find that the consultant’s comments
crossed “the boundary that divides mere advice from actual direction.”265 By
attempting to rescue the plaintiff, the consultant subjected the plaintiff to a

253. Id.
254. Id. Following her death, another cardiologist determined that Mrs. Diggs did not
suffer from pericarditis but suffered from an acute myocardial infarction while in the
emergency room. Id.
255. See id. at 390.
256. See id.
257. See id.
258. See id.
259. See id.
260. See id.
261. See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 37, at 74–76. Unlike ordinary negligence claims,
expert testimony is necessary to prove whether a physician breached the standard of care.
Baker, supra note 39.
262. See Gilinsky v. Indelicato, 894 F. Supp. 86, 94 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
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foreseeable risk of harm.266 Even without the aid of expert testimony, a jury,
drawing on their own experiences, could conclude that “the defendant, by
attempting to diagnose and direct the treatment of the plaintiff over the
telephone, failed to act as a reasonably prudent person under like
circumstances, and that such conduct was a substantial contributing factor in
bringing about the plaintiff’s injuries.”267
This case represents the viability of an ordinary negligence claim against
a physician based on their undertaking to provide medical advice.268 There
was no analysis of the existence a physician-patient relationship.269 Instead,
the duty analysis turned on whether there was an undertaking.270
B. Detailed Examination of On-Call Cases
While there are similarities between how courts analyze the duty question
in curbside consultations and for on-call physicians, interactions between
treaters and on-call physicians present unique circumstances that influence
the duty analysis.271 For cases dealing with on-call physicians, courts
primarily determine the degree of affiliation between the primary physician
and the on-call physician.272 The affiliation carries some authority or
obligation, which often leads to a finding of a duty of care.273
The existence of a physician-patient relationship depends on the degree of
affiliation between the treater and the on-call physician.274 Notions of
undertaking and foreseeability are often applied in both establishing an
implied relationship and in determining the existence of a duty of care
regardless of the relationship.275 Thus, while courts may categorize their
analysis as a qualification of the rule or an exception, the nuts and bolts of
their analysis often look very similar.276 Ultimately, these principles inform
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. See id.
269. See id.
270. See id.
271. Compare id., and Diggs v. Ariz. Cardiologists, Ltd., 8 P.3d 386, 387 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2000) (showing how courts analyze the duty question in curbside consultation cases), and
Bovara v. St. Francis Hosp., 700 N.E.2d 143, 148 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998), and Irvin v. Smith, 31
P.3d 934, 940 (Kan. 2001), and Hill ex rel. Burston v. Kokosky, 463 N.W.2d 265, 266 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1990), and Corbet v. McKinney, 980 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998), with
Talavera ex rel. Gonzalez v. Wiley, 725 F.3d 1262, 1270 (10th Cir. 2013) (showing how courts
analyze the duty question when a physician is on call), and Millard v. Corrado, 14 S.W.3d 42,
48 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999), and Mozingo ex rel. Thomas v. Pitt Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 415
S.E.2d 341, 346 (N.C. 1992), and Lownsbury v. VanBuren, 762 N.E.2d 354, 360 (Ohio 2002),
and Mead v. Legacy Health Sys., 283 P.3d 904, 911 (Or. 2012), and St. John v. Pope, 901
S.W.2d 420, 424 (Tex. 1995), and Prosise v. Foster, 544 S.E.2d 331, 332 (Va. 2001).
272. See cases cited infra note 274.
273. See cases cited supra note 271.
274. See, e.g., Talavera, 725 F.3d at 1270; Lownsbury, 762 N.E.2d at 360; Mead, 283 P.3d
at 911; St. John, 901 S.W.2d at 424; Prosise, 544 S.E.2d at 332.
275. See Talavera, 725 F.3d at 1270; Millard, 14 S.W.3d at 48; Mozingo, 415 S.E.2d at
346; Lownsbury, 762 N.E.2d at 360; Mead, 283 P.3d at 911; St. John, 901 S.W.2d at 424;
Prosise, 544 S.E.2d at 332.
276. See supra note 271 and accompanying text.
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whether there is a sufficient affiliation between the primary treating
physician and the other on-call physician.277
1. Qualification: Degree of Affiliation
Many courts analyze the duty question in on-call cases by investigating
whether a physician-patient relationship can be established.278 This includes
determining whether the on-call physician acted affirmatively, whether the
on-call physician was supervising residents, and what the physician’s
contractual obligations to the hospital included.279 However, courts have
come to inconsistent conclusions because they weigh and define the factors
differently.280
a. An Affirmative Act
Similar to curbside consultation cases, many courts determine whether an
on-call physician provided a service or affirmatively acted in the patient’s
case.281 For on-call cases, the analysis turns on whether the physician
provided an initial diagnosis or treatment plan such that they became
affiliated with the treating physician’s care of the patient.282
In St. John v. Pope,283 the plaintiffs sued the treating and on-call
physicians, claiming that their negligence caused permanent and severe
injuries.284 After having back surgery and epidural injections, the patient
came to the emergency room complaining of back pain and a fever.285 His
white blood cell count was also extremely high.286 The emergency room
physician, Dr. Suarez, examined the patient and initially diagnosed him with
lower back pain and acute psychosis.287 The patient’s wife wanted him
transferred to a hospital closer to their home.288 Dr. Suarez called Dr. St.
John, an internist who was on call for the hospital.289 Dr. Suarez gave Dr.
St. John the patient’s history of recent back surgery and explained that the
patient came in because of his fever and back pain.290 Given that he was not
a neurologist or neurosurgeon and the health facility was not able to handle
such cases, Dr. St. John recommended that the patient be referred to a

277. See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
278. See supra note 271 and accompanying text.
279. See infra Parts II.B.1.a–c.
280. See infra Parts II.B.1.a–c.
281. See supra note 271 and accompanying text.
282. See generally Talavera ex rel. Gonzalez v. Wiley, 725 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir. 2013);
Kelley v. Middle Tenn. Emergency Physicians, 133 S.W.3d 587 (Tenn. 2004).
283. 901 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. 1995).
284. Id. at 421.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 421–22.
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hospital which had a neurosurgeon.291 Dr. Suarez agreed with this
recommendation and began to arrange for the patient’s transfer by calling
another emergency room.292 However, the proposed hospital refused to
accept the transfer, so the patient’s wife then took him home.293 The next
day, Mr. Pope went to another hospital near his home, where physicians
discovered that he had a lumbar puncture that led to meningitis.294 Mr. Pope
suffered several permanent disabilities from the disease.295
The court held there was no physician-patient relationship between Dr. St.
John and the patient because Dr. St. John had not examined or treated him.296
Although Dr. St. John listened to the treater’s description of the patient’s
symptoms and came to a conclusion about the patient’s condition, he did so
for the purpose of evaluating whether he should take the case, not to
diagnosis or treat the patient.297 Because the on-call physician did not come
up with the initial diagnosis or contemplate a treatment plan that Dr. Suarez
was obligated to follow, there was no physician-patient relationship.298 The
on-call physician simply provided a recommendation that could be followed
per the treater’s discretion.299
In Mead v. Legacy Health System,300 the court analyzed whether the
physician knew or reasonably should have known that they were diagnosing
a patient’s condition or treating the patient.301 Here, the on-call physician
received a phone call from a resident asking for advice about a patient in the
emergency room.302 The next day, a nurse called the on-call physician to ask
if he would see the patient, but the nurse did not say the request was urgent.303
The patient argued a relationship was implied because the physician, in
response to the resident’s initial telephone call, offered his opinion that the
patient should be admitted to the hospital.304 By offering such an opinion,
the patient argued, he was acting in his capacity as the on-call
neurosurgeon.305 The court, however, determined that a jury could infer that
a physician-patient relationship did not exist because, inter alia, the on-call
physician did not directly examine, treat, or create a treatment plan for the
patient.306
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Additionally, the court fleshed out the meaning of “diagnosis” and
“treatment” to sort physicians’ actions into these two categories.307 The
court recognized that
whether a physician’s expression of an opinion constitutes a diagnosis will
vary depending on, among other things, the customary practice within the
relevant medical community, the degree and the level of formality with
which one physician has assumed (or the other physician has ceded)
responsibility for the diagnosis or treatment, the relative expertise of the
two physicians, and the reasonable expectations, if any, of the patient under
the circumstances.308

Based on these factors, the appropriate standard should be “whether a
physician who has not personally seen a patient either knows or reasonably
should know that he or she is diagnosing a patient’s condition or treating the
patient.”309
The above cases show that courts determine the degree of affiliation
between the primary treating physician and the on-call physician based on
the actions or inactions of the on-call physician.310 Through this lens, the
actions themselves, as well as the physicians’ perception of whether they
knew or reasonably should have known that they were diagnosing or treating
the patients, are significant to finding a relationship.311 This latter question
incorporates principles of undertaking and reliance in determining the degree
of affiliation and the presence of an implied relationship.312
b. Unique Expertise: Foreseeability of Reliance
Similar to curbside consultations, courts also investigate whether a
relationship exists between an on-call physician and a patient on the basis of
foreseeability, reliance, and undertaking.313 Specifically, they analyze
whether it is foreseeable that, given the expertise of the on-call physician as
a supervisor or specialist, the treating physician would rely heavily on an
opinion or recommendation.314 An on-call physician’s degree of affiliation
with the treating physician may be informed by whether the on-call physician
is in a supervisory role where interns, residents, and nurses might rely on
their expertise and knowledge.
In Lownsbury v. VanBuren,315 a patient sued a supervising physician after
her baby sustained severe brain damage due to the prenatal care and treatment
she received.316 The physician administered a nonstress test and an amniotic
307. Id. at 910.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. See id. See generally St. John v. Pope, 901 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. 1995).
311. See cases cited supra note 310.
312. See Mead, 283 P.3d at 910.
313. See cases cited supra note 274.
314. See generally Lownsbury v. VanBuren, 762 N.E.2d 354 (Ohio 2002); Prosise v.
Foster, 544 S.E.2d 331 (Va. 2001).
315. 762 N.E.2d 354 (Ohio 2002).
316. Id. at 355.
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fluid index test to the patient.317 Based on the results, the physician ordered
that the mother be sent to the labor and delivery unit to induce labor.318
Rather than following these instructions, the obstetrics residents
administered a contraction stress test319 and discharged the mother.320 The
baby was then born with permanent brain damage.321 The patient’s family
sued the supervising physician, Dr. Stover, alleging he was negligent in
failing to supervise the obstetrics residents who had cared for the mother,
leading to the baby’s permanent brain damage.322
Here, the issue was not whether the supervising physician had any contact
with the patient or the treating residents; rather, it was “whether and to what
extent Dr. Stover assumed the obligation to supervise the residents.”323 Did
the supervising physician “assume only a limited and passive duty to remain
in his call room until consulted by a resident with a problem, or did he assume
an active duty to gauge the performance of the residents or familiarize
himself with the condition of the patients at [the hospital]?”324 The court
found there was sufficient evidence that the jury could use to decide these
questions.325 Specifically, the consent form that was presented to the patient
was substantial evidence that the on-call physician was required to take an
active role in supervising the hospital’s residents and caring for the hospital’s
patients.326
The physician-patient relationship and subsequent duty of care arises from
circumstances that show a physician’s consent to act for the patient’s medical
benefit.327 The court in Lownsbury recognized that physicians working in an
institutional environment may assume a duty of supervisory care due to the
environment’s “myriad of complex and attenuated relationships.”328 These
relationships include the responsibility of either an individual physician or a
group of physicians to supervise residents, interns, and the like.329 This
supervision creates a level of skill and competence that ensures adequate
patient care.330 Thus, an on-call physician becomes affiliated, through acts
and duties of supervision, with the treating physician’s care of a patient.331

317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 363.
324. Id.
325. Id. Because the defendant’s motion for summary judgment was on appeal, the
question here was whether there was sufficient evidence to raise a genuine dispute of material
fact as to the existence of a physician-patient relationship between the supervising physician
and the patient’s mother. Id. at 357.
326. Id. at 363.
327. See id. at 360.
328. See id.
329. See id.
330. See id.
331. See id.
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The treating physician is almost mandated to rely on the expertise provided
by the supervising physician.332
Unlike Lownsbury, in Prosise v. Foster,333 the Supreme Court of Virginia
found that an attending physician did not have a duty of care in the absence
of direct contact with or consultation concerning the patient, even in the
environment of a teaching hospital.334 The on-call physician, Dr. Foster, was
not physically present in the emergency room but was available to answer
any questions from the treating residents and interns.335 During this time, a
four-year-old girl came to the hospital and was placed under the care of a
first-year resident.336 The patient had chicken pox lesions in her mouth, was
lethargic, and could not eat or drink.337 Earlier that month, the patient had
been treated for asthma with intravenous corticosteroids as an inpatient at
another hospital.338 The first-year resident consulted with a third-year
resident regarding the patient’s condition and prior treatment, then examined
the patient without reading her chart or learning that she had been treated
with corticosteroids.339 Neither resident called the on-call attending
physician regarding the patient’s condition or treatment.340 The residents
treated the patient for dehydration and released her with instructions to see
her pediatrician.341
The next day, the patient returned to the hospital and Dr. Foster saw her
for the first time.342 Dr. Foster diagnosed her with a condition in which the
chicken pox virus affects the body’s entire system.343 The treating team
placed the patient on an antiviral medication, but she died as a result of the
infection.344 The patient’s mother sued Dr. Foster, alleging she had a duty to
supervise the medical care rendered by the residents working at the
hospital.345
The court held that there were no facts that supported a finding that the
attending physician accepted responsibility for the patient.346 Dr. Foster did
not treat the patient or participate in any treatment decisions with the
residents during the initial visit.347 Neither the residents nor the hospital staff
consulted with Dr. Foster.348 Thus, simply agreeing to act as an on-call
attending physician in a teaching hospital was considered, on its own,
332.
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insufficient evidence to prove Dr. Foster assumed responsibility for the
patient’s case.349
c. Contractual Obligation: Undertaking
In determining the degree of affiliation between the treating physician and
the on-call physician, some courts consider the physician’s contractual
obligations.350 Courts have recognized that the obligations that flow from a
physician’s on-call status are not uniform.351 The obligations vary from one
institution to another, depending on their policies, contractual terms, and
agreements with on-call physicians, as well as the customary practices in the
relevant medical community.352 Thus, a physician’s degree of affiliation
with a particular patient may be informed by these unique policies and
obligations.
In Talavera ex rel. Gonzalez v. Wiley,353 a patient alleged that a physicianpatient relationship was formed based on the physician’s agreement with the
hospital.354 After fainting in a store bathroom, the patient arrived at the
hospital.355 She was seen by a nurse and complained of general weakness, a
sore throat and ear, and a headache.356 However, before Dr. Wiley, the oncall emergency room physician, could examine her, she left the hospital.357
The patient returned to the hospital that night, where she was seen by Dr.
Wiley, who ultimately discovered that the patient had suffered a stroke.358
The patient sued Dr. Wiley, claiming that he owed her a duty of care and
negligently prevented her from receiving the appropriate treatment, which
resulted in permanent physical and mental injuries.359
The patient argued that the terms of Dr. Wiley’s contract required him to
examine and treat patients within twenty minutes of their arrival at the
hospital.360 Thus, the contract allegedly created a physician-patient
relationship and established a duty of care to the patient.361 The court found
that no prior case in the state had explicitly held that a tort duty for a physician
349. Id.
350. See Millard v. Corrado, 14 S.W.3d 42, 50 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999); Corbet v. McKinney,
980 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (“Where the consultant physician does not
physically examine or bill the patient, a physician-patient relationship can still arise where the
physician is contractually obligated to provide assistance in the patient’s diagnosis or
treatment and does so.”).
351. See Mead v. Legacy Health Sys., 283 P.3d 904, 911 (Or. 2012).
352. See id.
353. 725 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir. 2013).
354. Id. at 1265.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id. The patient left the hospital against medical advice because she was not sure how
to pay for her care and felt well enough to leave. Id.
358. Id. at 1266–67.
359. Id. at 1267. The parties agreed that the onset of the stroke occurred when she was
found unconscious and the three-hour window to receive preventative treatment began to run
only at that time. Id. at 1269.
360. Id. at 1271.
361. Id.
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can arise through the physician’s contract with a hospital and refused to do
so here.362 Even if the court were to accept such a theory, the terms of Dr.
Wiley’s contract did not give rise to any duty.363 Reading the specific terms
of the contract, the on-call physician is only required to give a response
within twenty minutes, not to “see, examine, or treat” the patient
specifically.364 The time frame also could not be a condition that
automatically creates a relationship, as it would create a relationship with
every emergency room patient whose arrival the physician is notified of
within twenty minutes.365 Consequently, the court found no relationship
between the patient and Dr. Wiley on the basis of the contract and its
obligations.366
2. Exceptions to the Rule: A Duty of Care Despite No Relationship
Many courts assert that where there is an implied relationship, the
physician assumed a duty of care.367 However, some courts find an
undertaking even if there was no physician-patient relationship.368 Other
courts have emphasized whether or not it was foreseeable that the patient and
subsequent healthcare professional would rely on the physician’s actions or
expertise to prevent harm.369
a. Undertaking to Provide Care
Some courts have found an undertaking, regardless of the presence of a
physician-patient relationship, based on an on-call physician affirmatively
agreeing to supervise residents who the on-call physician knows are actually
treating patients.370 This involves the on-call physician knowing that
residents and interns will be relying on them for supervision and advice in
the actual treatment of patients given their expertise and the preset protocols
of the hospital.
In Mozingo ex rel. Thomas v. Pitt County Memorial Hospital, Inc.,371 the
court found that the on-call physician owed the patient a duty of reasonable
care in supervising the residents who actually cared for the patient.372 Dr.
Kazior, an employee of Eastern OB/GYN Associates, had an agreement with
the East Carolina University Medical School to provide on-call supervision
to the interns and residents in the obstetrics residency program.373 The
362. Id. at 1270.
363. Id. at 1271.
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. See cases cited supra note 274.
368. See generally Mozingo ex rel. Thomas v. Pitt Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 415 S.E.2d
341 (N.C. 1992).
369. See infra Part II.B.2.a.
370. See Mozingo, 415 S.E.2d at 345.
371. 415 S.E.2d 341 (N.C. 1992).
372. Id. at 342.
373. Id.
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patient, Ms. Mozingo, was admitted for the delivery of her child.374 Two
residents in the program treated Mozingo.375 That evening, Dr. Kazior began
his assignment providing on-call services.376 He remained at home and
available to take calls from the residents.377 That night, he received a phone
call from a second-year resident informing him that she had encountered a
problem with delivering the baby, who was now suffering from shoulder
dystocia.378 Dr. Kazior responded that he would be there immediately and
left his home to go to the hospital.379 By the time he arrived, the baby had
been delivered.380 Following the incident, the plaintiffs filed suit against Dr.
Kazior, alleging that his negligent supervision of the residents performing the
delivery caused the baby’s injuries.381
The court held that, because Dr. Kazior knew the residents were actually
treating patients when he undertook the duty to supervise them as an on-call
physician, he owed the patients a duty of reasonable care in supervising the
residents.382 Additionally, the court found that Dr. Kazior’s nontraditional
physician-patient relationship with the plaintiffs did not diminish his duty of
reasonable care when supervising the residents.383 Here, the undertaking was
determined outside the scope of the physician-patient relationship and
existed because an on-call physician affirmatively agreed to provide on-call
supervision of residents who they knew were treating patients.384
b. Foreseeability of Harm and Reliance
Some courts find a duty of care when harm to the patient is foreseeable as
a result of the patient and other healthcare practitioners relying on the
expertise, decision-making, authority, and obligation of the other
physician.385 “If the harm is particularly foreseeable, a duty will be
recognized as that is the touchstone for the creation of duty.”386 Thus, if,
under the circumstances, a reasonably prudent person would have anticipated
danger and provided against it, courts may recognize a duty to prevent harm.
For instance, in Warren v. Dinter,387 discussed above, the Minnesota
Supreme Court held that “a physician has . . . a legal duty of care based on
the foreseeability of harm.”388 The court emphasized that “when there is no
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Shoulder dystocia is a condition in which the baby’s shoulder becomes wedged in the
mother’s pelvic cavity during delivery. Id.
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Id. at 343.
382. Id. at 344–45.
383. Id. at 345.
384. See id.
385. See generally Warren v. Dinter, 926 N.W.2d 370 (Minn. 2019).
386. Millard v. Corrado, 14 S.W.3d 42, 47 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
387. 926 N.W.2d 370 (Minn. 2019).
388. Id. at 377; see supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text.
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express physician-patient relationship, we have turned to the traditional
inquiry of whether a tort duty has been created by foreseeability of harm.”389
Thus, the court inquired “whether it was foreseeable that Dinter’s decision
not to admit Warren, if made negligently, would be relied on by Warren,
through [the nurse], and cause her harm.”390 Specifically, was the relevant
danger objectively reasonable to expect?391
The court found that it was reasonable to conclude that the danger was
foreseeable to Dr. Dinter that the patient would rely on his actions and would
be harmed as a result of them.392 Because the nurse practitioner could not
admit the patient on her own, Dr. Dinter was tasked with making this
admission decision.393 As the gatekeeper, Dr. Dinter made a medical
decision not to open the gate to the patient, thereby impacting the subsequent
treatment she received and the harm she incurred.394 Further, “Dr. Dinter
knew, or should have known, that his decision whether or not to admit a
prospective patient, based on his own medical judgment, would be relied on
by [the nurse] and her patient.”395 Additionally, the court believed Dr. Dinter
also “knew, or should have known, that [such] a breach . . . could result in
serious harm.”396
The above case demonstrates the importance of foreseeability and reliance
in finding a duty of care.397 The court’s analysis did not include whether an
implied physician-patient relationship existed.398 Rather, the court found a
duty of care existed, that it was foreseeable that the physician’s medical
judgment would be relied upon by the patient and other healthcare
professionals, and that a breach of care would result in serious harm.399
c. Public Policy Considerations
Given the nuanced duty question, a few courts have determined that a
physician owes a duty of care to a nontraditional patient because of public
policy.400 In Millard v. Corrado,401 the patient was involved in a car crash
and experienced serious trauma.402 As a result, the patient suffered severe
internal bleeding and developed hypovolemic shock.403 The emergency
medical technicians brought the patient to a hospital known to operate as a
389. Warren, 926 N.W.2d at 375.
390. Id. at 377–78.
391. Id. at 378 (citing Foss v. Kincade, 766 N.W.2d 317, 322 (Minn. 2009)).
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. See id.
398. See id.; Millard v. Corrado, 14 S.W.3d 42, 47 (Mo. App. Ct. 1999) (recognizing that
foreseeability of harm can create a duty of care).
399. See Warren, 926 N.W.2d at 378.
400. See generally Millard v. Corrado, 14 S.W.3d 42 (Mo. App. Ct. 1999).
401. 14 S.W.3d 42 (Mo. App. Ct. 1999).
402. Id. at 44.
403. Id.
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twenty-four-hour emergency department and thus, expected to have a general
surgeon on call.404
Dr. Corrado, a general surgeon at this hospital, scheduled himself to be on
call, even though he was preparing to attend a meeting in another city in the
state.405 Before leaving for his meeting, Dr. Corrado had asked Dr. Jolly, an
orthopedic surgeon, to cover for him during the four-hour period that he
would be out of town.406 Dr. Jolly agreed to fill in for Dr. Corrado even
though he did not have privileges to perform general surgery.407 Dr. Corrado
did not notify anyone else at the hospital that he would be out of town and
unable to provide care to emergency room patients requiring a general
surgeon.408
When the patient arrived at the hospital, the emergency medical technician
paged Dr. Corrado because he was listed as the on-call general surgeon.409
The page went unanswered.410 An emergency room physician then
examined the patient and diagnosed her with an intra-abdominal bleed.411
Dr. Corrado was paged again but did not respond.412 Ten minutes later, Dr.
Jolly saw the patient and concurred with the previous diagnosis.413 However,
because he was not qualified as a general surgeon and did not have hospital
privileges, Dr. Jolly could not perform surgery on the patient.414 Around
twenty minutes later, Dr. Corrado called the emergency room and advised
that the patient be transferred to another hospital.415 Approximately four
hours after the accident, the patient underwent surgery.416 The patient later
sued Dr. Corrado, alleging that the delay in her treatment caused several
injuries.417
The court held that Dr. Corrado owed the patient a duty of care for the
patient’s ordinary negligence claim on the basis of certain public policy
factors.418 In determining whether public policy supports the recognition of
a duty of care, the court considered the following factors:
(1) the social consensus that the interest is worth protecting, (2) the
foreseeability of harm and the degree of certainty that the protected person
suffered the injury, (3) the moral blame society attaches to the conduct, (4)
the prevention of future harm, (5) the consideration of cost and ability to

404.
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.

Id. at 45.
Id. at 44.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 45.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 45–46.
Id. at 47.
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spread the risk of loss, and (6) the economic burden upon the actor and the
community.419

The court found that these public policy factors weighed in favor of finding
that Dr. Corrado owed a duty of care to the patient.420 Based on a Missouri
General Assembly regulation that requires on-call emergency room
physicians to arrive at the hospital within thirty minutes, the court found
evidence of a social consensus that emergency room physicians should attend
to their patients within a reasonable amount of time.421 It was also
foreseeable that the hospital would be presented with a patient requiring the
care of a general surgeon during Dr. Corrado’s absence.422 The court found
that “[i]mposing such a duty on ‘on-call’ physicians to notify appropriate
hospital personnel of their unavailability does not place an unreasonable
burden on the medical profession.”423 Given that a single phone call would
have reduced the period between the patient’s accident and surgery, a slight
inconvenience to the physician is trivial in comparison to the risk to
patients.424 Lastly, the court found that if on-call physicians had a duty to
give notice when they could not fulfill their responsibilities, it would prevent
future harm and reduce the number of such incidents.425
The court extended a duty of care to Dr. Corrado on the basis of public
policy and firmly held that this duty “will not have a detrimental impact on
the ability of hospitals to attract physicians to accept ‘on-call’
assignments.”426 By considering public policy, the court was able to balance
the public interest and address the duty question outside of any physicianpatient relationship.427
III. THE CREATION OF A CLEAR LEGAL STANDARD
Based on the above analysis, this Note argues for the creation of a clear
legal standard that would address the nuances of the duty question in cases
involving either a curbside consultation or an on-call physician. Part III.A
summarizes the case law for both curbside consultations and on-call
physicians and emphasizes the need to create a clear legal rule to address the
imperative duty question. Part III.B proposes a specific rule that includes a
step-by-step analysis for courts to apply when faced with a case involving
either a curbside consultation or an on-call physician.

419. Id. (citing Hoover’s Dairy, Inc. v. Mid-Am. Dairymen, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 426, 432
(Mo. 1985) (en banc)).
420. Id. The court determined that on-call “physicians owe a duty to reasonably
foreseeable emergency patients to provide reasonable notice to appropriate hospital personnel
when they will be unavailable to respond to calls.” Id. at 48.
421. Id. at 47.
422. Id. at 47–48.
423. Id. at 47.
424. Id.
425. Id.
426. See id. at 48.
427. See id.
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A. The Need for Clarity
Courts consider each case in the realm of curbside consultations and oncall physicians on their respective facts but have failed to provide a clear
legal standard.428 When determining liability, courts consider the confines
and scope of the physician-patient relationship but also consider when
physicians may owe a duty of care to these nontraditional patients in the
absence of such a relationship.429
In curbside consultation cases, most courts analyze the duty question by
determining whether there is an implied physician-patient relationship.430
Specifically, they analyze whether an affirmative act exists or not.431 Most
courts do not find that providing advice alone is a sufficient affirmative
act.432 However, most courts have also not formally defined what a sufficient
affirmative act is in such situations, nor have they formalized what actions,
in conjunction with providing advice, establish an implied physician-patient
relationship.433
While courts’ analyses often center around this act “requirement,” courts
also consider other factors, such as the length, duration, and detail of the
consult.434 Many have also analyzed whether it is reasonably foreseeable
that a patient may be injured as a result of the consulting physician’s actions
or whether the consulting physician undertook to advise the treating
physician in such a way that the treating physician would rely on the
recommendation.435 Foreseeability, undertaking, and reliance are embedded
in many courts’ approaches in considering both whether a physician-patient
relationship exists and whether a duty of care exists notwithstanding the lack
of such a relationship.436 In some ways, these principles act as guideposts
for courts grappling with the duty question.437
With on-call cases, courts are more willing to recognize a duty of care even
in the absence of a physician-patient relationship.438 The focal point of their
analyses is the degree of affiliation between the on-call physician and the
treating physician or healthcare facility. To determine this degree of
affiliation, some courts consider an on-call physician’s affirmative actions,
their unique expertise that may make reliance foreseeable, and contractual
obligations that create an undertaking.439 Regardless of whether a
relationship is found, some courts still consider whether there was an
undertaking to provide medical care, whether it was reasonably foreseeable
428. See generally Teresa Baird, Note, Who Is Actually Calling the Shots?: Watch Out,
They May Not Be Liable: Irvin v. Smith, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 185 (2003).
429. See generally Blake, supra note 30; Baird, supra note 428.
430. See supra Part II.A.1.
431. See supra notes 161–65 and accompanying text.
432. See supra Part II.A.1.b.2.
433. See supra Part II.A.1.b.
434. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
435. See cases cited supra note 209.
436. See cases cited supra note 240.
437. See cases cited supra notes 209, 240.
438. See cases cited supra notes 271, 274–75.
439. See cases cited supra note 274.
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that the physician would rely on the on-call physician, or if public policy
would favor finding a duty of care.440
While the above summary and case law demonstrate general trends in the
courts’ approaches, it remains unclear what factors may be dispositive to
their analysis. This Note argues that it is necessary for courts to develop a
clear legal rule for determining whether a duty of care exists between a
patient and either a consulting physician or an on-call physician.
Developing a clear legal standard will help to balance the interests of
physicians in sharing information and expanding their knowledge base
against the interests of patients who are negligently harmed. It would be
unwise to discourage physicians from advising colleagues or signing up for
on-call shifts—these practices are critical to the medical community and have
positive impacts on patient care.441 Thus, in light of evolving medical
standards and the increase in nontraditional care interactions, courts must
establish a more formalized rule to align physician expectations and patient
interests.
B. A New Legal Standard: Uniform Analysis of the Duty Question
Based on the above analysis of the case law, this Note proposes a uniform
framework that considers prominent trends in medical malpractice law, along
with important considerations of traditional negligence law. As a general
matter, courts’ duty of care analyses begin by building off of their
understanding of a traditional physician-patient interaction. However, with
the ongoing changes in medicine, it will be increasingly important for courts
to deviate from their understandings of traditional interactions and
relationships. The analysis below accounts for this.
This Note’s argument is specific to cases involving either a curbside
consult or an on-call physician. Nonetheless, other types of cases may raise
a similar duty question, such as when physicians serve as independent
medical examiners.442 This step-by-step analysis can be applied to other
such situations but may lack appropriate guidance specific to facts or trends
in those cases.
1. The Rule: Is There an Implied Physician-Patient Relationship?
To bring a viable claim for medical malpractice against any physician,
most courts require a showing of a physician-patient relationship.443
Therefore, the first step of a court’s analysis should be to consider whether a
physician-patient relationship—mainly an implied relationship—exists.
Depending on whether the court is presented with a case involving a curbside
consultation or an on-call physician, the dispositive factor in the analysis
differs. In curbside consultation cases, the analysis should turn on whether
440.
441.
442.
443.

See cases cited supra note 275.
See Blake, supra note 30, at 613.
See cases cited supra notes 68, 70.
See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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there is an affirmative act. In on-call cases, on the other hand, the analysis
should depend on the degree of affiliation between the on-call physician and
the treating physician or facility. If a court finds there is no relationship, this
will significantly reduce the viability of the medical malpractice claim as a
matter of law. Even if there is no relationship, however, a court may consider
applying a public policy approach to answer the duty question, but these
cases will likely be in the minority.444
a. Curbside Consultations: Is There an Affirmative Act?
In curbside consultation cases, courts should find that providing advice
alone is not a sufficient affirmative act and an implied physician-patient
relationship cannot be formed without any other affirmative action.445 To
determine whether there is an implied relationship in the context of curbside
consultations, a court must look for whether there was an affirmative act
taken on the part of the consulting physician. Courts can consider other
factors as well. However, if there is no affirmative act, there should be no
implied relationship. Thus, this factor should dispositive. This rule should
be steadfast.
The affirmative act requirement stems from the common-law notion of the
consensual nature of the physician-patient relationship.446 Courts can
consider what actions suggest that a physician has expressly or impliedly
consented to a relationship with the patient.447 Thus, courts can confine the
scope of an affirmative act to specific acts or services and, if those are not
present, then there is no relationship. What constitutes an affirmative act
should be defined as an act that involves either examining, diagnosing, or
treating the patient.448 Examples of such acts include physically examining
the patient, reviewing the patient’s chart, ordering tests, reviewing tests,
preparing reports, or providing recommendations that cannot be ignored.449
Given the ever-changing nature of medicine and healthcare delivery, this list
of acceptable affirmative acts may change over time. Therefore, this question
can be fleshed out by past and future case law.
b. On-Call Physicians: What Is the Degree of Affiliation?
Being on call alone is not sufficient to establish an implied physicianpatient relationship.450 But, unlike curbside consult cases, the key question
to determining the existence of an implied physician-patient relationship is
not whether the on-call physician acted affirmatively; instead, courts should
consider the degree of affiliation between the on-call physician and the
444. See Millard v. Corrado, 14 S.W.3d 42, 47 (Mo. App. Ct. 1999).
445. See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text.
446. Adams v. Via Christi Reg’l Med. Ctr., 19 P.3d 132, 140 (Kan. 2001); see Baker, supra
note 39.
447. See Adams, 19 P.3d at 140.
448. See cases cited supra notes 164–66.
449. See cases cited supra notes 164–66.
450. See cases cited supra note 271.
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treating physician or the healthcare facility. This should be the dispositive
factor in these cases. Where there is a significant degree of affiliation, a court
should find that an implied physician-patient relationship exists.
The ultimate cornerstone of a significant degree of affiliation is whether
the on-call physician has an obligation to respond to the patient’s case.451
Where there is a built-in relationship with someone who counts as a treating
physician or some kind of legal connection that authorizes or obliges the oncall physician to respond to the treating healthcare professional, there is a
powerful argument that there is a duty of care, no matter how many steps are
between the on-call physician and the treating one.452
The degree of affiliation factor is not explicitly mentioned in any of the
above cases. Rather, it appears as an unsaid consideration. To provide clarity
on how to determine the degree of affiliation, courts should consider which
factors may help their analysis, such as affirmative actions, supervision, or
contractual obligations. Courts may also develop the meaning of affiliation
over time through case law.
2. Qualification: Are There Other Considerations?
While the affirmative act or the degree of affiliation should be dispositive
to the creation of an implied physician-patient relationship, depending on the
kind of case, courts do not consider any one factor in a vacuum—other
circumstances and considerations inform their determinations. Similarly,
here, courts can turn to other factors—specifically, foreseeability and
undertaking—to support whether an affirmative act occurred or to determine
the degree of affiliation. However, these factors alone cannot establish an
implied physician-patient relationship.453 There must be an affirmative act
or a significant degree of affiliation present.
In the case law for both curbside consultations and on-call physicians,
courts consider whether it was reasonably foreseeable to the consulting or
on-call physician that a patient may be injured as a result of their actions or
obligations.454 Therefore, in determining this, courts may consider “the
likelihood of injury, the magnitude of the burden of guarding against it and
the consequences of placing that burden upon the defendant.”455
Additionally, courts may also consider whether the consulting or on-call
physician advised or provided medical care such that the treating physician
was not free to accept or reject the recommendations given.456 If the treating
healthcare professional felt obligated to follow the recommendations of the
on-call or consulting physician, where they felt they had no option but to
451. See cases cited supra note 271.
452. See cases cited supra note 271.
453. See Bovara v. St. Francis Hosp., 700 N.E.2d 143, 146 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998).
454. See id.; Reynolds v. Decatur Mem’l Hosp., 660 N.E.2d 235, 239 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996);
Lownsbury v. VanBuren, 762 N.E.2d 354, 363 (Ohio 2002).
455. Bovara, 700 N.E.2d at 146 (citing Lance v. Senior, 224 N.E.2d 231, 233 (Ill. 1967));
see also Reynolds, 660 N.E.2d at 239.
456. See supra notes 235, 253 and accompanying text.
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follow the opinion, a court should consider that to be an undertaking that can
support the finding of an affirmative act or a significant degree of affiliation.
The above considerations, taken together, incorporate principles of
reliance and foreseeability of harm, along with the creation of an undertaking.
These principles are the very bedrock of the duty of care in negligence law.457
Accordingly, courts can and should consider these subfactors alongside their
analyses of the affirmative act and degree of affiliation inquiries. This
determination—that reliance, foreseeability, and undertaking, on their own,
do not create an implied relationship—should not apply when a court
analyzes an ordinary negligence claim; rather, it should only apply to claims
of medical malpractice.
3. Exception: Public Policy Considerations
If a court does not find that there is an implied physician-patient
relationship, it may consider whether public policy supports the recognition
of a duty of care. A sample set of public policy considerations comes from
Millard.458
Public policy considerations should not be the first step in a court’s
analysis of the duty question. While policy considerations are important, the
duty question is a legal one and should not be answered on the basis of policy
alone. Further, if courts exclusively relied on public policy considerations,
issues of unpredictability and nonuniformity in this area would continue
largely unabated. Thus, public policy alone will not remedy the problem at
hand in these cases.
As a result, in the context of curbside consultations or on-call physicians,
courts should consider public policy only after they have analyzed the
physician-patient relationship. Given the uniqueness of the duty question,
there may be circumstances where addressing public policy is necessary for
the most comprehensive analysis.459 Therefore, this Note recognizes the
importance of such an approach but argues that courts should employ it only
after completing a physician-patient relationship analysis.
CONCLUSION
The duty question raised when a nontraditional patient sues a physician is
a difficult one. While many state and federal courts have approached this
question, none have created a uniform, predictable, or streamlined approach
to analyzing a duty of care. Without a clear legal standard, physicians and
patients alike remain uncertain about what the law is and when a viable claim
may be brought against a physician. Thus, it is imperative for courts to
develop a clear legal standard that creates a steadfast rule, with qualifications
and exceptions, that balances physicians’ expectations, modern practices in
medicine, and the interests of patients seeking redress.
457. See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 37, at 74–76.
458. See supra note 419 and accompanying text.
459. See supra note 419 and accompanying text.

